“Putting the linguistic method in its place”: Mackie’s distinction between conceptual and factual analysis by Lossau, Tammo
“Putting the linguistic method in its place”: Mackie’s distinction between conceptual and factual
analysis  1 
Tammo Lossau, Johns Hopkins University
ABSTRACT: Early in his career and in critical engagement with ordinary language philosophy,
John Mackie developed the roots of a methodology that would be fundamental to his thinking:
Mackie argues that we need to clearly separate the  conceptual analysis which determines the
meaning of an ordinary term and the  factual analysis which is concerned with the question
what, if anything, our language corresponds to in the world. I discuss how Mackie came to
develop this  distinction and how central  ideas of his philosophy are based on it.  Using the
examples of Mackie’s moral skepticism and his work on Locke’s theory of perception I show
how his methodology opens the door to error theories but can also support more positive claims.
Finally, I put Mackie’s methodology in a historical perspective and argue that in cases like the
Gettier debate, we can use it to cast light on the vagueness of the underlying methodology in
some philosophical debates.
John Mackie begins the preface to his 1973 volume Truth Probability and Paradox as follows (Mackie
1973, vii, my emphasis):
Philosophy,  to  be any good,  must  be analytic;  but  conceptual  analysis  is  not  the  whole  of
philosophy. Any genuine progress with philosophical problems requires the sort of argument
that takes account of alternative possibilities, that formulates suggestions precisely enough to
allow them to be examined and tested, that pays attention to the meaning of the words it uses,
1 For legal reasons, this version of the article does not include revisions stemming from the review process. I would like 
to thank Sören Hilbrich, Richard Teague, and the audience at the Hammond Society Colloquium at Johns Hopkins for 
corrections and suggestions that lead to significant improvements of this paper.
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and  that  reflects  critically  on  its  own  procedures.  But  the  aim  is  to  make  progress  with
substantive  questions,  to  apply  our  concepts  to  reality  or  to  consider  how  far  they  are
applicable, not merely to analyse or clarify those concepts themselves.
This paragraph contains an endorsement of what we know to be the core value of analytic philosophy
today:  clarity.  But  more  interestingly,  it  contains  a  statement  of  Mackie’s  own  resolution  to  a
methodological challenge of analytic philosophy more traditionally understood: analytic philosophers
in this sense engage in conceptual analysis; but the history of ordinary language philosophy has taught
them how limited conclusions about the best analysis of a given concept really are. Mackie wants
philosophy  to  address  more  “substantive  questions”,  and  he  suggests  to  do  so  by  thinking  about
whether and to what extent the concepts so analyzed apply to reality. This may sound harmless or even
obvious, but there is a flip side to this that leads Mackie to some of his more radical conclusions: the
methodology  he  has  at  this  point  developed consists  in  a  two-step  procedure.  First,  concept  C is
analyzed “blind” of whether any of the candidates for an analysis will be applicable to reality; second,
the applicability of the best analysis of C is considered – Mackie (1973, 12) calls this a factual analysis.
The separation of these two steps  leaves  room for  a  mismatch between concept  and reality,  i.e.  a
situation in which no real entities correspond to C. It is this mismatch that gives rise to the kind of
error theories Mackie is perhaps most famous for.
I will discuss Mackie’s take on the methodological challenge for analytic philosophy around the sunset
of ordinary language philosophy and his response to it. Then I will show how Mackie implements his
solution to this challenge discussing two examples: Mackie’s moral skepticism and his interpretation of
Locke’s views on perception. Finally, I will add some historical remarks on how Mackie’s perspective
of conceptual analysis differs from some of his contemporaries and argue that becoming clear about
these  differences  can  be  useful  to  philosophical  debates  using  the  debate  about  knowledge  as  an
example.
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1. Strength and Weakness of “Linguistic Philosophy”
During his philosophical education in Sydney and Oxford just before the second world war, Mackie
experienced ordinary language philosophy (OLP) as the dominant strand of philosophy, especially in
Britain; and this continued to be his impression at the time when he wrote his first publications after
having served in the war (cf. Mackie 1956, 3). A striking example of this is a series of papers in which
Mackie (1951a, 1952) defends John Anderson (his former teacher in Sydney) against criticisms from
Gilbert Ryle (1950) and Peter Herbst (1952). Ryle criticized Anderson for his descriptivist account of
ethics. Mackie (1951a, 109) responds:
Ryle is assuming that the task of philosophy is to analyse linguistic usage, and as an analysis of
the bulk of existing ethical usage Anderson's ethics would be absurd. In fact Anderson would
agree that if one wanted to analyse this usage – a task in which he is not particularly interested –
one would have to say that ethical terms have a prescriptive force, that (in Ryle's language) the
job they do is not merely a descriptive one. But Anderson is concerned with something else,
with the qualities of human activities, and here it is the prescriptive view that is, if not absurd, at
least very queer. It would be very strange if the character of an activity should itself command
its performance.
Mackie  (1951a,  110)  argues  that  “Ryle  is  concerned with  linguistic  analysis  whereas  Anderson is
concerned  with  the  features  of  the  things  talked  about”  and  that  this  difference  leads  Ryle  to
misunderstand Anderson in several ways. Mackie does not so much as decidedly defend Anderson’s
actual views, but he does defend the idea of investigating questions other than the analysis of our usage
of words. 
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The question of whether or not Ryle is really restricting himself to only analyzing such usage is the
topic of two further papers by Herbst (1952) and Mackie (1952) in this debate. Herbst argues that Ryle
is not restricting himself in this way, but Mackie (1952, 117) responds that if indeed he is not, his
criticism “becomes even sharper; it will be that these philosophers try to settle non-linguistic questions
by appeal  to  linguistic  usage.”  As an example of such overstepping of the boundaries of ordinary
language philosophy, he cites his discussion of Stephen Toulmin’s (1950) views on ethics (Mackie
1951b).  Toulmin uses linguistic arguments to advocate a version of rule-utilitarianism, but  Mackie
criticizes that he is ambivalent as to whether he means to hold this position merely as an analysis of our
“moral talk” or whether he thinks that  his  position has any prescriptive force.  In the former case,
Toulmin would not be doing ethics proper, but in the latter case he would be guilty of overstating the
conclusion of his arguments (cf. Mackie 1956, 9-11). The same dilemma appears to apply to Ryle:
either he is merely concerned with an analysis of moral talk, and thereby talking past Anderson, or he is
not, but then he would be inferring an “ought” from an “is”. 
Mackie’s  experience  with  OLP the  passage  quoted  above  reveals  is  this:  OLP restricts  itself  to
conceptual analysis, and it imposes this restriction as normative for philosophy as a whole. This means
that even works not written within the tradition of OLP are evaluated by the same standards, namely
whether what they claim can be taken as an appropriate analysis of the ordinary usage of the central
terms involved in it. From Mackie’s perspective, this is unfair towards philosophers like Anderson who
do not take up the task of providing such an analysis.  Ordinary language philosophers should,  on
Mackie’s  view,  restrict  themselves  to  understanding  our  usage  of  words  –  and  leave  people  like
Anderson alone.  If they do not,  they are guilty of making an inference from statements about our
linguistic  usage  to  statements  that  are  about  a  different  subject,  and  Mackie  does  not  see  any
justification for this. He later writes that ordinary language is “in principle incapable of deciding a
philosophical issue” (Mackie 1969, 113).
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We can  hear  Mackie’s  frustration  about  this  perceived  unfairness  in  his  inaugural  lecture  for  his
professorship at the University of Otago entitled Ordinary Linguistic Philosophy – Its Strength and Its
Weakness. For example, we can hear Mackie (1956, 15-6) complain about the lack of clarity and the
tendency not to state a clear conclusion, in particular aiming at Wittgenstein. He also opens with the
following characterization of ordinary language philosophy (Mackie 1956, 3, emphasis in original):
[P]hilosophers of this school [linguistic philosophy] hold that traditional philosophy is full of
confusions which are mainly due to misunderstandings of the use of words, and they make it
their task to diagnose and clarify such confusions. As a rule they rely on  ordinary language:
they appeal from the usage of the philosophers, which is often confused, to that of the man on
the street, who, they believe, cannot afford to talk nonsense.
Mackie  is  particularly  critical  of  the  “conformist”  strands  of  OLP,  which  hold  that  the  implicit
philosophical views held by the man on the street must be agreed with. Despite these overtones of
contempt, Mackie does not attack the “linguistic method” of conceptual analysis  per se, but merely
argues that it needs to be “put in its place”. The way in which he suggests to do so crucially depends on
the following distinction (Mackie 1956, 14):
In fact, the very notion of linguistic analysis is systematically ambiguous. Ordinary linguistic
behaviour will contain, implicit in its verbal procedures, the philosophical assumptions of the
ordinary man: to analyse it may mean simply to reproduce and emphasize and perhaps make
explicit these assumptions; or, again, it may mean to see through the ordinary behaviour to the
facts, to see real things the words refer to, and what people are actually doing with words as
distinct from what they think they are doing with them.
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This is where Mackie first hints  at  the distinction between “reproductive”  conceptual analysis and
factual analysis which I have already mentioned above.2 Mackie does not try to reject either of these
approaches. With respect to conceptual analysis, he recognizes it to be a legitimate project (cf. Mackie
1952, 117), but he rejects that any conclusions can be drawn from such an analysis alone that goes
beyond statements about  our ordinary usage.  The clearest  criticism of this  “conformist”  attitude is
found in a later paper where Mackie brands it as a “dogma” that our ordinary language is in order
(Mackie 1973, 11):
What I want to reject now is […] the sheer assumption that ordinary language is in order, that
once analysis has separated the components of any ordinary concept, its very ordinariness will
glue them together again. Merely to employ a concept may be to make an implicit assertion, for
example to assert that what users of the associated terms ordinarily intend to record or convey
goes along with the features on which the habit of recognition which is part of that concept
relies. This assertion cannot be eliminated on the ground that we cannot mean anything beyond
what is utilized by the habit of recognition; nor can it be accepted without further question on
the ground that the concept is an ordinary one.
Unwrapping this, what Mackie means with the “habit of recognition” are the aspects of the object that
lead us to think that something falls under a concept. For instance, seeing a finned animal swimming in
the sea might lead us to believe that we are seeing a fish – but Mackie would argue that in the case of
whales, we would be mistaken in that inference because what we actually mean by a “fish” excludes
whales. Now, most language users accept the distinction between whale and fish, so this is not actually
an example where ordinary language is not in order – but it is easy to think of a linguistic community
where this  distinction is  not  accepted.  In  such a  case,  the strand of ordinary language philosophy
2 I will use these two terms here only in Mackie’s sense, recognizing that “conceptual analysis” is often understood in a
much broader sense.
6
Mackie has in view here would be committed to argue that on this usage, whales do qualify as fish and
that therefore this usage is not to be criticized; whereas Mackie would argue that this usage is flawed as
it leads to a bundling together of objects that do not share the assumed similarities.
A reproductive conceptual analysis, as Mackie envisions it, should therefore not take sides on whether
any of what ordinary users of a term have in mind is real or correct. He simply views this as “quasi-
empirical study” (Mackie 1956, 16), which has the advantage of giving philosophers a scientifically
legitimate task. But the limits of this endeavor create a dilemma for OLP (Mackie 1956, 17):
[T]his empiricism about language is one source of the strength of this movement: it lets its
members feel that they have something new to do and something new to say […] But at the
same time these students of language are faced with a dilemma: Are they really making an
empirical study of linguistic behaviour – and, if so, are they not merely usurping the functions
of the grammarian or the linguist in the ordinary sense? Or are they still studying philosophy
and merely clearing linguistic obstacles out of its  way, treating language,  that is,  only as a
source of misleading suggestions against which we must be on our guard – and, if so, are they
not doing metaphysics after all?
Mackie’s own sympathies lie at the second horn of this dilemma where one would follow up on the
conceptual analysis with a factual analysis. For one thing, he states that he is “better pleased with a
philosophy that  disturbs than with one that  consoles” (Mackie 1956,  15).  For  another,  contrary to
adherents of OLP he has no problem with doing metaphysics (in the broad sense applicable here). 
Mackie’s lecture quoted here chiefly engages critically with OLP and does not do more than hint at a
positive  methodological  suggestion  that  “puts  the  linguistic  method  in  its  place”.  Such  a  positive
account  is  more  clearly  and  explicitly  suggested  in  the  opening chapter  of  Truth  Probability  and
Paradox (TPP) which I have quoted at the beginning of this paper. TPP, published in 1973, stands at
the beginning of the last decade of Mackie’s life. In this decade, Mackie began to publish his ideas in
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book form – he had tended to focus on articles, often short ones, up until that point. During this period,
Mackie published books on themes from Locke (Mackie 1976), moral error theory (Mackie 1977), the
analysis  of  causation  (Mackie  1980a),  Hume’s  views  on  morality  (Mackie  1980b)  and  a  critical
textbook  on  philosophy  of  religion  (Mackie  1982).  While  these  books  include  many  ideas  and
arguments Mackie had worked on before, it seems that he had settled on a perspective that allowed him
to put his thoughts on these subjects together in a systematic way. I want to suggest here that his
distinction of conceptual and factual analysis is an important part of how he was able to systematically
work on such a wide range of topics – I will try to make this point by discussing examples in the
following section.
But what exactly is Mackie’s methodology? As the opening passage from TPP quoted at the beginning
of  this  paper  suggests,  Mackie  thinks  conceptual  analysis  can  be  the  first  step  of  an  interesting
philosophical  investigation,  which  then  goes  on  to  apply  this  clarified  concept  to  the  world.  He
elaborates on this idea in the first chapter of TPP using Hume’s analysis of causation as an illustrative
example.3 Mackie (1973, 8-9) argues that on Hume’s view, our causal language both conveys that “This
A contiguously precedes this B, and every A contiguously precedes a B”, but in addition to that it also
conveys a “link” between cause and effect, such that one “pushes or pulls the other into existence”.
Assuming, at least for the sake of the argument, that this is an appropriate conceptual analysis of our
causal language, Mackie (1973, 12, emphasis in original) argues:
Hume might be right in thinking that we intend to convey that there is some sort of link between
cause and effect, and yet that we are systematically wrong, that there is in fact no such link as
we suppose. There is, then, a problem about the factual analysis of causation; we have the task
3 Interestingly, Mackie (1946, 82) already draws the analogy with Hume’s analysis of causation in his early works on
moral error theory. This indicates the impact Hume had on Mackie, but also that Mackie had developed at least the core
idea of this methodological framework early on and takes it to be applicable to this aspect of his philosophy.
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of finding out what goes on in the world in those sequences and processes that we mark off as
causal.
This factual analysis, he goes on, cannot be undertaken based on the speaker’s understanding of things;
and yet this analysis would be “too broad and general a topic for any of the particular sciences”, so it
takes philosophers to undertake it.4 He also points out that conceptual and factual analysis need to go
hand in hand, otherwise the factual analysis would be a somewhat aimless inquiry.
We can see now how Mackie thinks that conceptual analysis can help to clear up “confusions” and get
“linguistic obstacles” out of the way: in order to understand the source of these confusions, we need to
thoroughly  investigate  our  usage  of  the relevant  vocabulary.  Once we have  understood the  claims
underlying this usage, we do however need to follow up with a factual analysis and find out to what
extent these claims accurately describe the real world. It is possible that our language is indeed in order,
but we cannot dogmatically assume this from the start. Rather, we should do the conceptual analysis
without already having an eye on the second step. This two-step procedure, then, may indeed lead to
the result that our language is  not in order, and that we are mistaken to speak about some topic in a
certain way. Mackie interprets Hume as providing such an  error theory about causation. From this
perspective, it seems that OLP is concerned with an important part of what philosophers should be
doing (and what people like Hume already have been doing), but it is completely ignoring another part
of philosophy. This leaves OLP with the choice to restrain itself to somewhat uninteresting conclusions
or to make unwarranted inferences from the conceptual to the factual. Mackie suggests that the only
way out is to go back to doing more than mere conceptual analysis.
4 One may well disagree that it is always broadness or generality that gives rise to a philosophical investigation of a
factual  matter.  Some might  even  suggest  that  the  factual  analysis  of  causation lies  within the realm of physics  –
although this  seems true only of  a  narrowed use  of  the term common to philosophy that  excludes psychological,
sociological or historical causes. However, at least in the case of ethics which I will discuss below it seems clear that it
takes philosophers to investigate what kind of entities relating to values there are in the world.
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2. The Conceptual/Factual Distinction at Work
I have discussed how Mackie sees OLP trapped in a dilemma between self-restraint and argumentative
inadequacy and how he suggests to resolve this dilemma by combining conceptual and factual analysis.
It will be helpful to see how Mackie implements this program. I will discuss two examples: his moral
error theory and his views on perception.
Let us begin with Mackie’s views on ethics, which are both among the first he developed (Mackie
1946) and among the most influential ones up until now.5 Mackie (1946, 77-8) addresses the issue that
“we think we can also  judge that actions and states are right and good, just as we judge about other
matters of fact, that these judgments are either true or false, and that the qualities with which they deal
exist  objectively.”  He  argues  that  statements  of  such  judgments  cannot  be  regarded  to  be  simply
expressions  of  feelings  (as  emotivism6 claims),  for  this  would  not  allow  us  to  accommodate  the
impression that  in  the  case of  moral  disagreement  there  is  a  disagreement  of  beliefs.  In  his  early
treatment of the topic, Mackie (1946, 81) takes the refutation of emotivism to establish that our moral
statements are “describing objective facts”. In his later Ethics (Mackie 1977, 29-35), his argumentation
“that conceptual analysis would reveal a claim to objectivity”  has gained in depth. Mackie now offers
two considerations in favor of this claim: first, our moral judgments are anchored in a philosophical
tradition which by and large subscribes to such a claim to objectivity. Second, he argues that ordinary
5 See Joyce 2001, Joyce and Kirchin 2010 and Olson 2014 for some contemporary advocates of Mackiean views.
6 Mackie (1946, 80-1) adds against the emotivist that to say that such statements are mere expressions of feelings of
approval or disapproval that introspection shows that contrary to what Stevenson claims we do not take ourselves to be
“merely ejaculating when we talk in moral terms.”
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speakers seem to want to imply such a claim, too, when they make moral judgments; and when they
wonder what is morally right, they are searching for more than just something relative to their own, or
their  society’s desires or conventions.7 Thus he concludes our moral judgments presuppose values8
which  are  “action-directing  absolutely,  not  contingently  [like  hypothetical  imperatives]  upon  the
agent’s desires and inclinations” (Mackie 1977, 29). As Richard Garner (1990) points out, the idea of
absolute direction of action which Mackie claims is presupposed in moral judgments is most plausibly
understood as an inescapable authority these values allegedly have over us.9
But, as Mackie (1977, 15) begins the first chapter of Ethics, “[t]here are no objective values.” He offers
two arguments  for this  (Mackie 1977, 36-9;  Mackie 1946):  first,  he argues that  the historical  and
regional variations in moral codes seem to suggest that in most cases, people do not act according to
what they believe is morally right, but conversely believe those actions to be morally right which they
are  already  performing  (or  which  are  idealizations  of  what  they  are  doing).  This  is  more
straightforwardly  explained  by  the  assumption  that  moral  codes  are  conventional  than  by  the
assumption  that  they  are  distorted  perceptions  of  objective  moral  truths.  Second,  he  argues  that
objective moral values would be “queer” entities, for they would have to be very different from any
other  object  we are  familiar  with  –  indeed,  if  we take  moral  statements  to  presuppose  values  of
7 The evidence for this appears to be merely introspective, as this is simply stated as a fact about “[t]he ordinary user of
moral language” (Mackie 1977, 33). One may criticize this as hasty; however, a defense or criticism of Mackie’s results
is not the focus of this paper.
8 In his earlier treatment, Mackie (1946) talks about facts instead of values.
9 This suggestion is more plausible than the alternative interpretation, on which those values are internally motivating. It
seems that the folk usage of moral vocabulary does not rule out that some people see what is morally right but are not
motivated by it. However, it seems plausible to say that it is presupposed in our folk usage that they should act in
accordance with what is right. This is in line with what Mackie said with respect to the Anderson/Ryle debate (see
above).
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inescapable authority, no other entities we are familiar with seem to even come close to this. Relatedly,
defenders of such entities would have to say how we could have any knowledge of these entities, as our
regular ways of perceiving things seem to be inapt to arrive at any conclusion about them. Given all
this, we seem to have reason to consider the existence of inescapably authoritative values very unlikely,
and thereby to consider moral statements to be (very likely) false.
Both steps of Mackie’s argument can be objected to individually, but a discussion of these objections is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, it  is important to point out that Mackie would reject the
following kind of  complaint:  we make moral  statements  all  the  time,  and we make them without
considering  ourselves  to  be  claiming  something  that  is  as  strange  as  Mackie  makes  it  out  to  be.
Therefore we should analyze those statements in a way that allows them to be true; and if Mackie’s
complaints about objective values are any good, we need to look for such an analysis either in the
emotivist or the constructivist camp. The idea of this objection is that the factual analysis can override,
at least to some extent, the linguistic arguments for some hypothesis in the conceptual analysis. But
Mackie is unwilling to recognize any interference of the factual analysis with the conceptual analysis;
he  argues  elsewhere  that  “questions  about  the  analysis  of  concepts  or  meanings  are  distinct  from
questions  about  what is  there,  about what goes on” (Mackie 1980a,  1).  So if  one objects  to error
theories because they are error theories, one shifts the question from one concerning what we actually
intend to convey to one concerning what we should be conveying. What this shows is that Mackie’s
notion of conceptual analysis is still very much derived from OLP, in which our usage of words is the
only acceptable type of evidence for some proposed conceptual analysis. Conceptual analysis, on this
notion,  needs to proceed  blind of the factual analysis. The case of Mackie’s analysis of our moral
language shows how such a procedure may lead to an error theory.
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Another good example of the separation of conceptual and factual analysis  are Mackie’s views on
perception which he developed in the 1960s (Mackie 1969) and more fully in his book Problems from
Locke (Mackie 1976). While Mackie’s official project here is exegetical, he does state that the theory of
perception  he  reads  Locke as  subscribing  to  can  be  defended against  objections;  and how it  can,
according to Mackie, be defended is what I am interested in here. 
Mackie ascribes to Locke a “representative” theory of perception according to which the contents of
our perception are ideas understood as intentional objects. On this view, our perception is not veridical:
we can be seeing a horse in virtue of an internal representation of a horse even when there actually is
not a horse in our field of vision, i.e. the perceptive state would be identical in both cases. This view
allows us to account for differences between our representation of objects and their reality. However, it
is also subject to what Mackie calls the “veil-of-perception problem”: Berkeley and others have held
that such a position leads to the view that our entire reality is constructed of appearances, not allowing
any reality beyond the content of our perceptions, thereby establishing solipsistic phenomenalism (cf.
Mackie 1976, 47-53). Mackie (1976, 54-5) suggests that this objection really conjoins two separate
problems:
When it is argued that if we start within the circle of our own ideas we can never break out of
that circle, […] two problems are being run together, a problem of meaning and a problem of
justification. The problem of meaning is this: if all we are directly acquainted with is ideas […],
how can  we  meaningfully  assert  or  even  speculate  that  there  is  a  further  reality  that  they
represent:  how  can  we  give  meaning  to  the  terms  that  will  express  this  speculation?  The
problem of justification is this: if all we are directly acquainted with is ideas […], how can they
give us any good reason to believe that there is a further reality that they represent[?]
He argues that adapting a verificationist theory of meaning according to which the only way to answer
the first  question is  to  say what  would count  as  evidence for statements  about  an external  reality
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conjoins these two problems and forces one to adopt phenomenalism according to which we are only
acquainted  with  ideas.  But  according  to  Mackie  a  verificationist  theory  rests  on  a  fundamental
confusion (Mackie 1976, 56):
From the start [a verificationist theory of meaning] seems to involve a confusion of categories,
in that what has (or lacks) meaning will be a sentence or some linguistic entity, while what can
be true or  false,  verified or falsified,  confirmed or  disconfirmed,  is  a  statement,  something
which a meaningful sentence may be used to express or convey. The question of meaning must
have been answered satisfactorily before any question of truth or verification or confirmation
can arise.
It is easy to see how this maps to Mackie’s more general views: we need to address the question what
our assertions about an external reality such as “There is a tree outside of my window” mean as a
question purely about the correct conceptual analysis of those sentences. This analysis then can be
followed up on by a factual analysis: is the statement expressed by this sentence true and what evidence
do I have to support this statement?
Given this distinction, Mackie argues that the answer to the question of meaning must be that the
contents of our experience “are seen as real things without us – that is outside us” and that “everything
we can assert, believe, speculate, or even question about reality is a logical construction out of the
contents of our experience” (Mackie 1976, 61-2, emphasis in original). It follows that it is a different
thing to say that there is a tree outside of my window than to say that I see, or seem to be seeing, a tree
outside of my window. Mackie also adapts Bertrand Russell’s (1912, 17-26) solution to the problem of
justification according to which we can respond to skeptical doubts by saying that the hypothesis of a
reality that is by and large in line with our experiences is  simpler than any hypothesis of Cartesian
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deception  (Mackie  1976,  64-7).  My  point  here  is  not  to  discuss  or  defend10 Mackie’s  particular
responses, but to point out the framework he set up for addressing them as separate questions: Mackie
provides a conceptual analysis of statements about the reality and then opens up the question whether
these statements are true or well-confirmed. In this case, he emerges with a positive answer to the
second question, but the result could have been negative just as well. We can see how this leads him to
oppose verificationism: the idea of this position is to conceptually analyze our language such that it will
not make unwarranted statements about an external reality – just like emotivists and constructivists
would  analyze  our  moral  language  in  such  a  way  that  it  does  not  express  unwarranted  or  false
statements.
I have given two examples in which the separation of conceptual and factual analysis drives Mackie’s
philosophy  and  leads  to  substantial  disagreement  with  philosophers  who  do  not  subscribe  to  this
distinction. As both of the examples discussed above illustrate, Mackie thinks that we must proceed in
our conceptual analysis blindly, not having an eye on the factual analysis yet. This opens up the door to
error theories: our language may rest on false or unwarranted presuppositions. In fact, Mackie also
holds error theories about our talk of facts (Mackie 1952) and secondary qualities (Mackie 1976, 10-
11), he holds that our causal judgments express counterfactual relations unwarranted (but explained by)
experience (Mackie 1980a, 54-7) and adapts Hume’s argument against belief in miracles which can be
read  as  an  error  theory  (Mackie  1982,  13-29).  These  examples  show  that  Mackie’s  two-step
methodology leave room for error theories, but on the other hand they equally allow that our concepts
10 In fact, very few epistemologists adapt Russell’s response to skepticism. For one thing, it is unclear in what sense the
hypothesis of a material world with roughly the features we think it has is simpler than solipsism; for another, it is also
easy to object on behalf of the skeptic that this appeal to simplicity is unwarranted – after all, if a Cartesian scenario
were correct, our inductive justification for simplicity would fall apart, so appealing to simplicity on this fundamental
issue seems to beg the question against the skeptic.
15
have perfectly good applications in reality (as Mackie argues is true with respect to perception). David
Lewis (1989, 136-7) admits that “strictly speaking, Mackie is right” about moral values, but that it is “a
matter of temperament” whether to adapt his error theory or whether to interpret our language more
favorably  to  common  sense.11 The  discussion  above  should  show  that  it  is  in  fact  a  matter  of
methodology:  if  Mackie is  indeed right  about  our  moral  language and the claim that  there are  no
objective values, his error theory arises naturally from the separation of conceptual and factual analysis.
3. Mackie in Context
Having discussed Mackie’s methodology and how it originated from his way of addressing OLP, let me
offer  more  general  historical  remarks  regarding  how  Mackie’s  methodology  relates  to  his
contemporaries and the later philosophical debate.
As  we  saw,  Mackie  was  unsatisfied  with  OLP because  it  would,  if  argued  carefully,  only  yield
conclusions about the meaning of our language, not about anything beyond that. A staunch defender of
OLP might  argue  that  the  meaning  of  language  is  the  only  legitimate  subject  of  philosophical
investigation and that the project of factual analysis is either not a philosophical inquiry or is bound to
lead to mere speculation. But Mackie is unwilling to accept this restrained view of what philosophy can
do, and he shares the desire for giving philosophy a broader territory with many of his contemporaries;
for instance, we saw above how Herbst tried to defend Ryle by re-interpreting his program in a way
that does allow such statements. Although arguing for this point goes beyond the scope of this paper, it
is not implausible that this discomfort led a younger generation of philosophers in the 1950s to abandon
OLP in  the  form  in  which  Wittgenstein  and  Ryle  had  pursued  it.  But  we  also  saw  that  Mackie
11 A similar criticism is voiced by Frank Jackson (2000, 103-4),  who accuses  Mackie of  favoring error theories  and
generally viewing the folk view as distorted.
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appreciated something about OLP after all: his criticism does not target the way in which conceptual
analysis is pursued by ordinary language philosophers. Mackie’s point is to put conceptual analysis “in
its  place”,  that  is  to  use  it  as  a  first  step  in  a  philosophical  investigation and not  to  overstate  its
conclusion. But he seems to think that OLP (or at least some of it) had it right as far as the procedure
for conceptual analysis goes. In particular he agrees that questions about the fact of the matter should
be screened off from conceptual analysis.
Saying that Mackie appreciated something about OLP must be followed by a qualification. Mackie’s
methodology rests on the assumption that conceptual analysis will yield a clear enough result to allow
us to test its applicability to reality – and this assumption may well be challenged. We can see here why
Mackie holds Wittgenstein in contempt: Wittgenstein tends to argue that many concepts resist the kind
of clear and univocal analysis that Mackie wants and needs. If, for example, we admit that the concept
of a “game” cannot be spelled out in terms of necessary or sufficient conditions (cf. Wittgenstein 1953,
§§66-7),  it  will  be almost impossible to critically investigate whether the things we call  a “game”
actually meet the criteria for being a game. Rather, we might end up saying that the concept of a game
applies  wherever  we  usually  apply  it,  and  the  only  task  philosophy  is  left  with  is  to  provide  an
instructive list of instances. When Mackie complains about a lack of clear conclusions, this is what he
is referring to.
But Wittgenstein cannot be dismissed so easily: the idea that our ordinary concepts (or at least some of
them) are fuzzy and unruly is, at the very least, an option that we need to take seriously when we
approach a conceptual analysis. This has led Rudolf Carnap (1950, 5-8; 1956, 7-8; 1974, x) to suggest
that instead of pondering the ordinary concepts, philosophers may suggest more precise explications of
that concept which get rid of the vagueness of the ordinary concept but still approximates its linguistic
meaning. These new concepts would be superior to the somewhat arbitrary naturally formed concepts
in virtue of their exactness, fruitfulness, and simplicty. The criterion of fruitfulness allows that we take
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into account  factual  information when deciding on an explication.  Concepts that  do correspond to
entities in reality (of which we can justifiedly assume they exist) are more fruitful, for exampls for the
formulations of empirical laws, so these concepts would seem to be better explications of the relevant
terms.  From  the  Carnapian  perspective,  Mackie  opens  the  door  to  too  much  vagueness  in  his
conceptual analysis when he continues to base it solely on our usage – or at least he would have to
allow it if he were to follow through on his OLP-inspired approach to conceptual analysis. At the same
time,  Mackie  could  not  easily  have adapted  Carnap’s  notion  of  explication:  construing conceptual
analysis traditionally as Mackie does is a precondition for a clear separation of conceptual and factual
analysis.  Once  one  allows  conceptual  analysis  to  be  revisionary,  one  is  under  pressure  to  allow
revisions that avoid the kind of error theories Mackie is open to. In this way the factual analysis would
begin to affect the conceptual analysis, something which Mackie thinks needs to be avoided.
We  can  see,  then,  one  source  of  disagreement  with  Mackie’s  method.  If  one  is  convinced  by
Wittgensteinians that many of our ordinary concepts resist a precise analysis, one must be skeptical as
to whether Mackie’s idea of factual analysis, if such a thing is a feasible inquiry at all, can be of any
use in these cases. For without a clearly stated analysis of the relevant concept, one cannot check
whether this concept aptly applies to reality. One may then be tempted to sidestep ordinary language
and use a more precise explication instead. But this opens the door to arguments from the factual side.
Resorting to explications therefore flies in the face of the idea of investigating whether there are any
such entities in a separate second step.  So both Wittgensteinians and Carnapians each would have
separate concerns with Mackie’s methodology.
On the other hand Mackie can and does recognize other methodological approaches as long as their
conclusions are not overstated. As we have seen towards the beginning of this paper, he allows for a
linguistic investigation of ordinary language that merely aims to understand our usage of terms. While
he suggests that philosophers may be entering linguistic territory here, he makes it clear that there is
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nothing inherently wrong with this. Secondly, there is no obstacle for him to also allow explications of
terms. Our ordinary language indeed contains many vague terms and one may well announce to use
these terms in a slightly different way that is more precise or has the benefit of capturing real entities.
However, this should not be presented as a better conceptual analysis but rather as a clarification, an
alteration of a terms meaning that one makes use of for one’s own purposes without claiming it to
concern ordinary language.
In closing,  let  me look at an example where I think Mackie’s reflection on conceptual and factual
analysis  could have been helpful:  the debate about  knowledge following Edmund Gettier’s  (1963)
famous paper on the analysis of knowledge. Throughout this debate, Gettier and many others provided
“counterexamples” to some suggested analysis of knowledge, i.e., they presented cases in which the
suggested theory is not in line with our intuitions about whether a certain subject in that case counts as
knowing. This methodology seems to suggest that the project is one of pure conceptual analysis – as an
explication, the idea that knowledge is justified true belief would not be off the table simply because of
a fairly limited set of circumstances in which we would find that analysis counterintuitive. On the face
of it, then, the Gettier debate might be understood as a complex problem of conceptual analysis.
An interesting case  in  this  debate  is  Peter  Unger’s  (1975) suggestion  to  understand knowledge as
requiring infallibility with respect to the relevant proposition. This position requires a subject to be in
an epistemic position were she can rule out even the most remote possibility of error to count as
knowing – a  position we are only in with respect to  very few propositions.  Unger provides fairly
elaborate linguistic arguments and an explanation why we think and talk in a way that would suggest
that we know much more than we actually do. As such, Unger advocates an error theory that resembles
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some of Mackie’s views.12 Some have tried to provide examples suited to show that there are clear
cases of knowledge in which the relevant subject  is fallible; but another strand of resistance comes
from the fact that Unger’s views are branded as skeptical. Skepticism is seen as a  non sequitur, and
analyses  of  knowledge  that  lead  to  the  result  that  we  lack  knowledge  of  the  external  world  are
described as unattractive on these grounds. 
This type of argument, though, does bring in the factual analysis: it uses as its premise the fact that an
infallibilist  analysis  of knowledge deprives us of knowledge of the external  world.  This raises the
question how the resulting analysis is to be understood: is it still a conceptual analysis that aims to
interpret  our  use  of  the  word  “knowledge”  in  a  way  that  avoids  attributing  a  lot  of  (at  least
semantically) false assertions to us; or is it an explication that is meant as a replacement of an ordinary
term that leads to confusions? In the former case, proponents of this arguments would need to elaborate
why the ascription of false assertions counts against a proposed conceptual analysis; in the latter case,
the  question  arises  whether  and  why  proponents  of  this  argument  feel  bound  to  fairly  specific
counterexamples brought  up in the Gettier  debate and do not consider  accepting these as cases of
knowledge  for  the  sake  of  greater  simplicity.  That  is,  if  one  is  trying  to  give  an  explication of
knowledge, justified true belief would still be on the table despite a limited class of counterexamples.
I have brought up the debate about knowledge because it shows that methodological considerations
about  conceptual  analysis  have  stepped to the  background in  the post-OLP era,  even though such
methodological considerations would be much needed here. To a certain extent Mackie’s distinction
12 An important difference is that Mackie argues that we really think that moral values are objective or that causation
involves a necessary connection between the relevant events. Unger would not say that we think that we are infallible in
the strong sense he requires; inasmuch as we think about Cartesian skepticism, we likely realize our fallibility. Unger’s
position – or at least Jonathan Schaffer’s (2004) elaboration of it – for this reason is supplemented with a pragmatic
theory that explains why we convey something else than the strong semantic meaning he claims. By contrast, Mackie
would claim that we express and convey that an action is objectively wrong when we judge it to be immoral.
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between conceptual analysis and factual analysis can help get a clearer view of what certain theories
may legitimately claim or what kind of evidence may count in their favor or against them. This is not to
say that Mackie’s methodological framework needs to be accepted: it is equally legitimate to pursue a
project of giving an explication or a Wittgensteinian approach which puts greater emphasis on the
manifold ways in which we can use a term. But inasmuch as one tries to use conceptual analysis as a
stepping stone in one’s inquiry,  it  is  necessary to justify any way in which one allows the factual
analysis to have any impact on it.
Conclusion
I have discussed how Mackie developed his distinctive approach of separating conceptual and factual
analysis  in  reaction  to  ordinary  language  philosophy.  While  Mackie  sees  OLP in  a  fundamental
dilemma between self-restraint and baseless claims, he adapts a notion of conceptual analysis that is in
line with the ideals of OLP. His idea is to do conceptual analysis completely independent of facts other
than our usage of the words, but to bring in these facts at a later stage. This opens up the door to error
theories according to which our usage of language may be false or unjustified, as Mackie thinks is the
true  in  the  case  of  our  moral  language.  However,  as  Mackie’s  discussion  of  Locke’s  theory  of
perception shows, his methodology also has the potential to defend positive claims. Mackie’s idea of a
conceptual  analysis  must  be  distinguished  from  a  perspective  that  favors  Wittgensteinian  cluster
concepts or Carnapian explications. However, I have tried to point out using the example of the debate
about knowledge that if one does pick up on a notion of conceptual analysis akin to Mackie’s, one
needs to respond to the distinction between conceptual and factual analysis and is under pressure to
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